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Changes in the Situation of the Hungarian 
Minority in Yugoslavia during the Period 
of Royal Dictatorship 
The assassination of Stjepan Radic and his fellow representatives in the Parlia-
ment and the introduction of royal dictatorship are often simply equated, even in 
scholarly literature. Although it is true that the shot fired by a representative of 
the radical party made the total failure of cooperation between Serbs and Croats 
in the Parliament obvious to everyone, the introduction of royal dictatorship was 
brought about by considerably more complex factors.1 The Serbi-Croat opposi-
tion had begun to paralyze the country in its day-to-day functioning. Before 1929 
none of the parliaments had managed to serve its full term: twenty-three gov-
ernments of different composition had held the rudder of the centralized state. 
By the end of the 1920s it had become clear to the royal court and the support-
ers of centralism that political power-relations were developing in an unfavorable 
way. A former leading figure and supporter of centralism, the democrat Svetozar 
Pribicevic, allied with the Croatian Peasants Party against Belgrade (creating the 
Peasant-Democratic Coalition) and thus began the collaboration of Croatian and 
Serbian anti-centralist forces. This domestic development carried with it the dan-
ger of the Croatian Peasants Party's expanding beyond its national boundaries 
and becoming a collective party of various forces of opposition in the country. 
Budapest's urging of the Hungarian Party (Magyar Párt. MP) to leave the radical 
club had only reinforced this process. The Croatian Peasants Party did not even 
try to conceal its intention to become a collective party of the opposition, and the 
Peasant-Democratic Coalition openly called for the reform of the state's struc-
1 The personal fate of the assassin, Punisa Rasic is interesting in itself. He was sentenced 
to ten years in prison for his crime, but he was released by the Germans after they had 
occupied the country. In 1944 Rasic was found by one of the partisan divisions which 
liberated the city of Belgrade, sentenced to death, and executed. 
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ture. According to their ideas, the unity of the country could be symbolized only 
by the king, and the structure of the federalist and dualistic South Slav state, 
which they envisaged, would have to be built on the wide-ranging autonomy of 
the historical provinces of Serbia and Croatia. 
King Alexander considered three courses of action in the face of this crisis. He 
played with the idea of the "amputation of the country", i.e. the possibility of 
"releasing" Croatia from the structure of the state, but he abandoned this idea 
very soon. This suggestion arose essentially at the meeting of Apor and Maiek. 
Alexander also tried a conventional solution and appointed a new government of 
different composition, which, for the first time in the history of the kingdom, was 
headed not by a Serb, but by a Slovene, Antun Korosec. In the end - and, inter-
estingly enough with international consent - he decided that "no mediator 
should stand between the People and the King any more", i.e. he suspended the 
constitution, dissolved the political parties and the nationally based unions and 
associations, and even prohibited the use of terms that denoted the names of sin-
gle nationalities in the country. To Alexander, these measures were necessary be-
cause they seemed to offer the only possibility of preserving "the unity of nation 
and state," because, as he stated it in his proclamation of 6 January 1929, parlia-
mentarism had led to "intellectual depravation and national discord."2 It was 
rightly stated in the 1929 annual report of the British Embassy in Belgrade: "Un-
der those difficult circumstances, into which the new Kingdom with three names 
had been plunged by the conflicts among the political parties, the impatience of 
the opponents, the excessive striving after power and fortune, the permanent 
government crises, the murder in the Parliament, and the distrust among the fac-
tions, it would have been difficult to think of any other power than that of autoc-
racy which could have created order out of the present chaos."3 
We interpret the king's step as a further political maneuver, due to the lack of 
any other means, to try to consolidate the integration of the state, which had been 
held up largely by political measures anyway. By founding the new state Alex-
ander hoped to forge together the nationalism of the Serbs and the Croats, and 
thus to achieve the resurrection of the "tribes" of a unified South Slav nation 
- believed in and hoped for by many - in the name of a supranational polity. The 
catalyst would have been the Yugoslav "state discipline." Unitarism is usually 
identified as the basis of his dictatorship, but it is nevertheless necessary to note 
the following: Alexander's unitarism was based on the idea that the state had to 
represent a common, unified will, because that was the only way it could become 
2 B. Petranovic-M. Zecevic, Jugoslavia 1918-1984. Zbirka dokumenata. [Yugoslavia from 
1918 till 1984. A collection of documents] Belgrade 1985, 262. The proclamation has 
been published in Hungarian in: E. A. Sajti, ed. Jugoszlávia 1918-1941. Dokumentumok. 
[Yugoslavia 1918-1941. Documents] Szeged 1989,177-178. 
3 Z. Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godisnji izvastaji Britanskog poslanstva u 
Beogradu 1921-1938. [The British on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Annual reports of the 
British mission in Belgrade, 1921-1938] Arhiv Jugoslavije. Vol. 1. (1921-1930), Zagreb 
1986, 587. 
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the basis of a "unified spiritual renewal." He was convinced that if he created 
"Yugoslavia" (which is what he had changed the name of the country to from the 
former Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which referred to the exis-
tence of the three South Slav nations), he could also create a unified Yugoslav na-
tion. He tried to have a supranational integrating program accepted as the politi-
cal will of the state, coming from above, which idea was rejected by the majority 
of even those Serb political forces that supported and symbolized governmental 
unity. The later death of Alexander was symbolic in the sense that this living leg-
end of Yugoslavism was actually murdered in Marseilles by Macedonian and 
Croat proponents of "tribal" nationalism. 
After the proclamation of the royal dictatorship, the Hungarian government 
sent the following message to the capital of the Yugoslavian state through Baron 
Pál Forster: "Regardless of the change of the regime that has occurred in Yugo-
slavia, [the Hungarian government] wishes to keep up and cultivate the good re-
lations which have developed between the two countries in recent years." This 
intention of the Hungarian government, the message continues, was based on the 
hope that the new Yugoslavian government was guided by the same wish. Al-
though Hungary definitely did not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia, "the relation of the two countries does not remain unaffected by the 
treatment of the Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia by the Yugoslavian gov-
ernment."4 In other words, the establishment of the dictatorship itself had no ef-
fect on Budapest's general attitude toward Belgrade. 
The proclamation of the royal dictatorship meant the prohibition of all politi-
cal parties in the country, and thus the Hungarian Party was also dissolved. For 
the approximately half a million Hungarians in Yugoslavia a period had ended in 
which it seemed possible to advance the interests of the Hungarian minority 
through political deals, by taking greater or lesser advantage of the conflicts be-
tween the Slav political parties, or by holding fast to the rules of the constitution 
and of parliamentarianism. But it was not only a radical narrowing down of the 
field of political play. The dictatorship also abrogated the privileges which had 
been achieved by the Hungarian Party with great difficulty. Not only did it put 
an end to the possibility of parliamentary politics, but it also destroyed the suc-
cesses achieved at provincial and community elections. The change of regime 
brought with it the complete replacement of elected lower- and middle-grade 
public officials.5 The provincial assemblies were dissolved, mayors replaced by 
military officers, elected community committees dissolved, and by the suspen-
sion of the right of public meeting the work of cultural groups was made impos-
sible. The establishment of censorship also affected Hungarian newspapers. As is 
well-known, the dictatorship was proclaimed not out of hatred of minorities, but 
rather as an attempt to solve the Serbian-Croatian conflict. Oddly enough, in the 
4 Hungarian National Archives (HNA), K-63, Documents of the Political Department of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1929-16/4-382. 
5 The last Hungarian notary was dismissed in 1931. 
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beginning it was received with great relief by the majority of the Yugoslavian 
public and by the leaders of the Hungarian minority among them. 
The leaders of the Hungarian Party were forced to live in political exile in the 
first years of the dictatorship. At first it was because the new political regime, due 
to the logic of its own system, did not even attempt to enter a political dialogue 
with the minorities, and later it was because Belgrade was looking for new faces 
for its politics. Their dream was to establish a unified Yugoslavian nation which 
they hoped to forge together from the opposing South Slav "tribes" by artificial, 
exclusively political means. This concept could not tolerate any independent par-
ties of minorities. 
The dictatorship found its man among the Hungarians in the person of Dr 
Gábor Szántó, a physician from Subotica (Szabadka), whose task was to gather 
the Hungarians under the banner of Yugoslavism in the Yugoslav National Party 
(Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka - JNS), while at the same time making fre-
quent statements of loyalty. This party was founded in December 1931, after the 
proclamation of the so-called forced constitution. This constitution prohibited the 
foundation of associations and parties on an ethnic or religious basis. In the pe-
riod of pseudo-parliamentarianism the minority politics of the regime was based 
on the idea that ethnic minorities would be given minor, but highly touted privi-
leges, as a special favor of the regime, by way of a centrally chosen and appointed 
leader of that minority. This policy was meant to demonstrate the stability of the 
regime and the integrity of the country. After the dissolution of the Parliament, 
cronyism, which had always played an important part in the political life of the 
country, could flourish without any constitutional restrictions. The government, 
headed by General Petar Zivkovic, was appointed by the king from among his 
closest supporters, and middle-grade state positions were given to people be-
longing to these circles on the basis of their loyalty, services, friendship, or politi-
cal reliability. It was widely known that Szántó, for example, was a personal 
friend of the future prime minister, the radical Dragisa Cvetkovic, and that he 
had rendered him a great service by resigning from the Hungarian Party in 1927 
to take a prominent part in the organization of the Hungarian section of the Radi-
cal Party. In exchange for his political services Szántó was given a seat in the Par-
liament at the first parliamentary elections held on 1 November 1931, and he thus 
managed to get into the two-chamber skupstina (parliament) as the only Hungar-
ian representative.6 The new Parliament was marked by considerable changes: 
out of its 305 members only 98 had been representatives earlier. 
Fulfilling the promise he had made to his French supporters, and in order to 
consolidate the internal basis for his dictatorship, Alexander proclaimed a new, 
so-called 'forced' or 'imposed' constitution on 3 September 1931. According to 
this constitution, half the members of the Upper House were to be appointed by 
the king for six years, while the other half were to be elected by the committees 
6 Arhiv Vojvodine (AV) F 126, Banska uprava Dunavske banovine. Kabinet bana, 
poverljivi broj (The Archives of Vojvodine [AV] F 126. The office of the ban of the Ba-
nate. The cabinet of ban, confidential number) 163,199,223/1933. 
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and officers of the banates. (The Senate had ninety-six members.) The Lower 
House was elected directly, but by open ballot, for a four-year term. The Parlia-
ment was not allowed to enact laws without royal consent, and the executive 
power was concentrated in the hands of the monarch, but royal decrees had to be 
signed by the ministers. The party that won the majority of the votes at the open 
ballot received two-thirds of the seats, and also got a proportional share of the 
remaining votes. According to the officially published data, which were rightly 
declared by the opposition to have been falsified, the Yugoslav National Party 
(Jugoslovenska Nacionalna Stranka), the only party taking part in the parlia-
mentary elections, won 65% of the votes.7 
As part of the national crisis-solving strategy during the period of the great 
economic depression, the government of the dictatorship granted a moratorium 
on the debts of the Hungarian peasantry. They also held out the prospect of ex-
tending the agrarian reform to the Hungarians, and promised to establish a Hun-
garian teacher training college in Belgrade. Soon after his election, Szántó got 
permission to speak in the Parliament, something that the representatives of the 
Hungarian Party had never managed to achieve, and he promoted the cause of 
the teacher training college and the agrarian reform. The "loyalty movement" of 
the Hungarians was rewarded in Belgrade by new appointments of middle and 
lower ranking officials in the administration of the banates.8 
Gábor Szántó, who was considered a traitor both in Budapest and in the cir-
cles of the former Hungarian Party, worked hard to earn the confidence of the of-
ficial circles. He organized "the healthy Hungarian forces," which was given 
great publicity by the press. It seems that Szántó's activity met with little appre-
ciation even in certain Slav circles. When Szántó engaged himself in organiza-
tional work in Senta (Zenta) for a newly christened governmental party, the 
Yugoslavian Radical Peasants' Democracy (Jugoslovenska Radikalna Seljacka 
Demokratska Stranka), he came into serious conflict with Milan L. Popovic, who 
was also working on organizing the same party, and who was a former Hungar-
ian parliamentary representative and later became a representative of the Serbs in 
the Hungarian parliament after the re-annexation of the territory. In his report of 
June 1933 to the ban (provincial governor) of the Danubian Banate, the county of-
ficial of Senta (Zenta) considered Szántó's group "a disciplined, cold-blooded, 
compact" assembly, but on the other hand he called Popovic and his followers 
turncoats engaged in harmful activities with respect to "both national and party 
interests," because they hindered the "already deeply rooted process" of spread-
ing the idea of Yugoslavia among members of the Hungarian minority.9 Of the 
7 Petranovic-Zecevic, op. cit., 273; Avramovski, op. cit., Vol. 2. (1931-1938), 38-39. 
8 In May 1929, the country was divided into nine banates (major administrative units). 
Voivodina became part of the Danubian Banate, with Novi Sad (Újvidék) as its center. 
Belgrade was not designated as the center of any banate. At the same time, the former 
33 counties of the country were abolished, and the name of the country was changed 
from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to Yugoslavia. 
9 AV F 126, Banska uprava Dunavske banovine. Kabinet bana, poverljivi broj 223/1933. 
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former leaders of the Hungarian Party it was only Ödön Nagy who lent his name 
to Szántó's activities. According to contemporary sources, he wished thereby to 
improve his "hopeless" financial situation. 
In the meantime, the old politicians of the Hungarian Party, who were forced 
to draw back from politics, but still had contacts with Budapest, continued their 
work in sometimes legal, sometimes illegal cultural associations in the face of fre-
quent house searches and harassment by the police. 
Soon after the proclamation of the dictatorship a top-secret decree was issued 
which prohibited leaders of the Hungarian Party from holding passports. In cases 
where one was still issued, the holder's movements were monitored "with special 
attention" by the authorities. In the spring of 1930, for example, house searches 
were carried out at Leo Deák's and Ödön Palásthy's homes, because "they or-
ganized a campaign to expose the cultural situation of the Hungarians." Not only 
political activity, but also the officially permitted cultural activities of clubs and 
associations was made impossible. For example, the leaders of associations had to 
give three days notice to the police about their planned visits to the provinces, 
and they had to pay the daily allowance of the officials who supervised their 
gatherings. Printers were instructed verbally by the police not to bring out any 
books, handbills, invitations, and the like for some time.10 The refusal to issue 
passports was considered so grave by the Hungarian government that they re-
peatedly emphasized it during the negotiations in the second wave of the Hun-
garian-Yugoslavian rapprochement in the late 1930s, and they held out the pros-
pect that "if the situation does not change, we will be forced to subject Hungarian 
tourists going to Dalmatia to similar restrictions."11 
The charge of the almost ritualized acts of sedition and irredentism became 
stronger in the period after the assassination in Marseilles, and a great number of 
Hungarians of Hungarian citizenship (2,700 persons) were expelled from Yugo-
slavia, primarily during the proceedings instituted by the League of Nations 
against Hungary in connection with the assassination, i.e. October to December 
h> AV F 126 I. 69676/1930. F 126 II. 3526/1929. HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1929-16/4-3146. According to the re-
port by Ambassador Forster, there were 83 Hungarian cultural, economic, and reli-
gious associations at the time of the proclamation of the dictatorship, including reading 
groups, women's societies, smallholders' associations, and firefighters' associations, as 
well as religious groups of the Reformed Church. HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents 
of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1929-16-351. 
11 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1938-16-664; 1939-16-758. According to the statistics made by Baron 
György Bakach-Bessenyei, the ambassador of Hungary in Belgrade, 687 were pass-
ports issued by the Yugoslavian authorities to members of the Hungarian minority of 
more than half a million people in the year 1936, 809 passports in 1937, and 440 in 1938. 
These statistics do not reflect the number of trips without visa, e.g. those with simpli-
fied travel documents who attended to the Eucharistic Congress in Budapest or to the 
Open Air Festival in Szeged. HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political De-
partment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1939-16-150. 
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1934.12 According to Yugoslavian sources, there were still 21,316 people in the 
country who had opted for Hungarian citizenship.13 
Along with the relaxing of the dictatorship, but in a gradually tightening 
situation in domestic and foreign affairs, and with the Hungarian-Yugoslav rap-
prochement of the late 1930s, it became more and more obvious to the Yugoslav 
government that Szántó belonged to a "lightweight group in public life." It was 
also clear to them that Szántó's activity was viewed with disdain by the Hungar-
ian government. Further, Szántó was not acknowledged as the leader of the 
Hungarian minority, especially not by the Hungarians themselves. The govern-
ment was forced to contact the former leaders of the Hungarian Party again. 
On 28 April 1937, after the community elections in Voivodina, Prime Minister 
Milan Stojadinovic met Imre Várady, Dénes Streliczky, and Leo Deák, former 
leaders of the banned Hungarian Party. The negotiations centered on the new 
political role of the former leaders, their cooperation at the elections, and the 
compensation that would be offered in return. The goal of Várady and his group 
was to revive the Hungarian Party, but the Prime Minister did not even want to 
hear of this. In exchange for support at future parliamentary elections, the gov-
ernment party made a promise to end its practice of analyzing family names to 
establish ethnicity, to authorize new cultural associations, to re-appoint Hungar-
ian teachers in Hungarian regions, and to settle the long-lasting question of the 
Hungarian teacher training college in Belgrade.14 
It was an indication of the changing times that in June 1937 the general as-
sembly of the "guilty town" of Subotica (Szabadka) adopted with enthusiastic 
approval a formerly unimaginable resolution proposed by the president of the 
Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), a nationalistic organization. According to 
the resolution, the Lajos Kossuth Foundation, which had been created before 1918 
but had later ceased to function, was to support the schooling of Hungarian stu-
dents, who were to become "the pioneers of the Hungarian-Yugoslav collabora-
tion."15 What was behind the tolerance shown by the Yugoslav government and 
public was, on the one hand, the gradual worsening of the international situation 
of Yugoslavia, and, on the other, some internal political considerations. By 1937, 
the French system of alliances, and especially the Little Entente, was in ruins, 
Nazi Germany was preparing for war, England was moving toward a peaceful 
modification of the system of peace treaties in Europe, and Italy had made an al-
liance with Germany. The negotiations between the Hungarian government and 
the Little Entente began in Sinaia, Romania, in May 1937. The subjects of the ne-
12 AV F 126, ibid. 372, 376/1933; S. Mesaros, Madjari u Vojvodini 1929-1941. [Hungarians 
in Voivodina, 1929-1941] Novi Sad 1989, 108-109; V. Vinaver, Jugoslavia i Madjarska 
1933-1941. [Yugoslavia and Hungary, 1933-1941] Belgrade 1976, 83-91.; M. Ormos, 
Merénylet Marseille-ben. [Assasination in Marseilles] Budapest 1984,165-200. 
13 Mesaros, op. cit., 108. 
14 HNA, K-28, Documents of the Department of Minorities of the Prime Minister's Office, 
1937-R-15785. 
15 Pesti Napló [Pest Journal], 2 June 1937; Nemzeti Figyelő [National Observer], 6 June 1937. 
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gotiations were a non-aggression pact, the recognition of Hungary's equal right 
to arm itself, and the minority question. However, the treaty initialed in Bled, 
Yugoslavia, was never brought into effect, because on the closing day of the con-
ference the Hungarian delegation was informed about the acute danger of 
Czechoslovakia's occupation.16 In spite of their failure, the negotiations made it 
possible for the question of the Hungarian minority to become an issue in nego-
tiations between the two governments again, much like it had been in the period 
of Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement in the second half of the 1920s. There 
was a further issue that had an effect on the situation, namely Belgrade's growing 
concern about a new, dynamic organization from Zagreb led by the lawyer Iván 
Nagy. Nagy openly collaborated with the United Opposition, and it was to be 
feared that a movement in support of Zagreb - in opposition to the old group 
ready to seek compromise with Belgrade - would gain popularity among the 
Hungarians. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs first received a report on 
Iván Nagy from the Hungarian consul in Belgrade at the end of 1926. At this time 
Nagy, a law student, was the head of a local Catholic students' association called 
Vojvodina. The consul's attention was drawn to the new student leader by the 
fact that, as he put it, "this organization is the Hungarian Party at the university, 
hiding behind a Christian epithet, and it is fighting fairly boldly against the he-
gemony of Serbian- and Yugoslavian-hearted students' clubs, hand in hand with 
various Croatian students' associations founded in accordance with the programs 
of the parliamentary parties." The consul was then instructed by the Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs "to keep the contacts with them to the minimum."17 
How times had changed was indicated by the fact that in 1937/38 Budapest's 
main concern was to establish a collaboration between the radical youth in Za-
greb and the old Hungarian conservative political group, and how they should be 
used against Belgrade. 
Iván Nagy first tested his strength on the ticket of the United Opposition at 
the election held in the county of Stari Becej (Óbecse) on 5 May 1935, but his at-
tempt was unsuccessful. The strength of his political movement came not so 
much from his own political success, but from the Serbian-Croatian conflicts and 
the growing internal political importance of Macek's party, as well as from the 
Hungarian government's time-tested tactics in connection with Yugoslavia, 
namely "to have several irons in the fire." However, in order for them to be able 
to count on Iván Nagy seriously in one way or another in the future, it was cru-
cial to establish a dialogue and cooperation between the old politicians of the 
south and Iván Nagy's group. With respect to the Baíka (Bácska) and Banat re-
gions, Iván Nagy, working in cooperation with the Croatian Peasants Party, 
seemed dangerous, because not only did he proclaim the slogan of the autonomy 
16 For more about this question see M. Ádám, Magyarország és a kisantant a harmincas évek-
ben. [Hungary and the Little Entente in the Thirties] Budapest 1968. 
17 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1926-16-605. The Zagreb consulate was raised to the level of consulate 
general in the fall of 1940. 
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of Voivodina, consistently rejected by the Hungarian Party, but also later, after 
the Serbian-Croatian compromise, he did his best to have Subotica (Szabadka), 
Sombor (Zombor) and its neighborhood annexed to the Croatian banate. Leo 
Deák and his companions rightly considered this a dangerous move, because 
they were worried that the already limited prospects for promoting the interests 
of the Hungarian minority, would get even worse if they were split between Bel-
grade and Zagreb. But they also had to see that by posing the land question in 
a radical conservative way, Iván Nagy had an impact on segments of the Hungar-
ian minority which the old Hungarian Party politician could not even reach. And 
while Budapest encouraged Deák and Várady to initiate a dialogue, Belgrade was 
watching the possible reconciliation of the two groups with growing concern. 
They knew that there were negotiations going on between Iván Nagy and Leo 
Deák about settling their conflicts. As Svetislav Rajic, the Danubian ban, wrote to 
the prime minister, Milan Stojadinovic, in 4 June 1938: a united front of the Hun-
garians would mean that, following the example of the Croatians, they would 
immediately "demand maximal minority rights, and then autonomy". "I am fol-
lowing the movement with attention," the ban wrote, "and I have managed with 
the help of a confidant of Hungarian nationality to ensure that the enterprise 
would yield no particular results. I did not vigorously oppose the negotiations, 
because I was convinced that Imre Várady, a lawyer from Pétervárad, could stop 
the action without any difficulty..." Together with Várady, the ban also sum-
moned Leo Deák, who entered into conciliatory negotiations, and made clear his 
disapproval of the enterprise. On this occasion Várady promised to achieve 
a "compromise" between the two groups, according to the ban's letter, in the pres-
ence of Deák. "With this move," Ban Svetislav Rajic's report to the prime minister 
continues, "Várady has repeatedly proven that he is a devoted follower of the 
idea of Yugoslavia and the royal government can always count on his faithful co-
operation. I think that should be taken into consideration especially when estab-
lishing a collaboration with the leaders of the Hungarian minority."18 The ban 
seems to have kept his word this time, and Várady was soon appointed senator, 
as will be seen. It is interesting to note about the negotiations between Deák and 
Iván Nagy that a "Hungarian-Hungarian united front" would have meant a dis-
tancing from every Slav party, with the aim of reorganizing the united Hungar-
ian Party. The significance of the event is best indicated by the fact that the ban 
and Stojadinovic were informed about the negotiations also by the chief of the 
Yugoslav general staff. The by then more than seventy-year-old Várady had 
learned a lot from his Serb political partners, of course, and he knew the way 
things were in Belgrade. It was also clear to him that the radical Iván Nagy could 
not yet be discounted. In return for calming down the unification negotiations, 
Stojadinovic offered to ensure that at the upcoming parliamentary elections it 
would not necessarily be Szántó who would get a seat in the parliament. 
At this time Yugoslavia was watching events in Czechoslovakia and later 
Hungary's territorial growth with great concern. In this changed international 
AV, F 126. Kabinet bana, pov. br. 108/1938. 
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situation, and parallel with the growing internal opposition to centralism, Bel-
grade started to show an increasing interest in negotiating with the Hungarians. 
At the elections held on 11 December 1938, the Yugoslav government decided to 
give up the idea of Szántó's Yugoslavian "fidelity movement", which irritated 
both the Hungarian government and both political wings of the Hungarian mi-
nority. The Hungarians were given a slot on the ticket of the government party. 
The candidate was the previously independent Gellért Fodor, community leader 
of Horgos (Horgos), and not one of the old politicians of the Hungarian Party. 
The Hungarian Government raised no objections against Fodor, but they knew 
very well through the ambassador that Belgrade would definitely be averse to the 
candidacy of Iván Nagy. Budapest also had reasons not to support Nagy, and so 
his candidacy was not encouraged. In January 1939 the old, experienced, and al-
ways Belgrade-oriented Hungarian politician from the Banat, Imre Varady, was 
appointed senator. The elections of December 1938 were the last parliamentary 
elections held in royal Yugoslavia. The results testified to the growing power of 
the opponents of centralism. The Yugoslav Radical Union (Jugoslovenska radi-
kalna zajednica, JRZ), led by Stojadinovic, received 54.01%, while the United Op-
position, headed by Vladko Maiek, obtained 44.9% of the votes. The third party 
listed was the radical nationalistic Yugoslav National Movement (Zbor), founded 
by Dimitrije Ljotic, which received only one percent of the votes. Because of the 
peculiar distribution of votes, however, the composition of the Parliament did not 
reflect the results of the elections at all: the government party was given 306 seats, 
while the opposition obtained only 67.19 
A couple of days after his election, Gellért Fodor, who emerged out of former 
anonymity, felt the need to visit György Bessenyei, the Hungarian ambassador to 
Belgrade. At the meeting he made it clear to him that he had accepted candidacy 
only at the personal instigation of Svetozar Stankovic, Minister of Agriculture, 
who was known to be a supporter of the Hungarians,20 but he told the minister 
already at that point that "he should not assume that he would take the role of 
a second Gábor Szántó, but rather that he wished to work for the good of the Hun-
garian minority with honesty."21 Because the Yugoslavian government was so 
ungenerous in offering seats in the parliament and clearly refused to approve the 
Hungarian Party, Budapest did not discourage Iván Nagy's activities in Zagreb. 
19 E. A. Sajti, ed. Jugoszlávia 1918-1941 [Yugoslavia 1918-1941], 224. 
20 In the second half of the 1930s, the responsibility within the government for dealing 
with the affairs of the Hungarian minority was entrusted to an appointed minister who 
also spoke Hungarian. After the reannexation of the southern regions in 1941, during 
an extremely tense political situation because of the pacification of the region and the 
1942 police-raid, Svetozar Stankovic did a great deal as a private person to ease the 
Hungarian-Serb conflict. The other supporter of Hungarian affairs in Belgrade, besides 
Stankovic, was Nikola Beslic, Minister of Transportation. In 1943 they both took 
prominent roles in the attempt at Hungarian-Serbian rapprochement. E. A. Sajti, Dél-
vidék 1941-1944. [Southern Region 1941-1944] Budapest 1987, 74-76. 
21 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1939-16-41; 83. 
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Generally they thought that "it would not be advisable to hinder Nagy's listing as 
a candidate of the opposition, considering the earlier policy of Ttaving several 
irons in the fire', regardless of any other aspects."22 The policy of "having several 
irons in the fire" was indeed nothing new in the politics of Hungarian govern-
ments with respect to Yugoslavia. As we have already seen in addition to their 
sometimes weaker, sometimes stronger intention to pursue diplomatic talks, they 
maintained cautious and secret relations from the very beginning with political 
powers opposing the centralist unity of the country, among others with the 
Croatian separatists.23 Iván Nagy's potential political dominance was not consid-
ered timely yet. In the summer of 1939, negotiations were resumed between the 
two parties to clarify disputed matters, and a committee of arbitration was or-
ganized. According to this decision, both groups could maintain their political 
orientations and relations, while the conciliation committee of six members 
would demonstrate the unity of the Hungarian minority to the outsiders. Iván 
Nagy, Imre Várady, and Leo Deák were members of the committee, of course. 
Until the end of Yugoslavia's existence the relationship between the two political 
groups was determined by this agreement, which was acknowledged by Buda-
pest with joy, and by Belgrade out of necessity. 
In connection with this turn of events, the "old man" of the Hungarian mi-
nority of the southern regions, the politically very experienced Várady, said the 
following at a celebration organized by the Hungarian Cultural Society of Zren-
janin (Becskerek) for his seventy-fourth birthday: "I have traveled a lot lately, 
I heard biting criticism and remarks which also referred to the right wing, but 
everywhere in the souls the great secret wish of the Hungarians arose: let there be 
unity among the Hungarians. [...] Today we cannot ponder how weighty the rea-
sons are that separate us, now we can only consider where the meeting point 
might be. [...] By discussing every public question concerning our Hungarian 
ethnic group in concert, we mean to serve our race with all our powers and influ-
ence in accordance with our laws."24 The Hungarian ambassador formulated 
things more carefully, because, as he pointed it out, the original task of the com-
mittee of arbitration, the working out of a common party platform, had not been 
achieved.25 
From the spring of 1938 onwards Yugoslavia's international situation deterio-
rated rapidly. From that time on it was surrounded by Germany, which had an-
nexed Austria; by Hungary, since that fall enlarged with the territories of Upper 
Hungary; and by Italy, with Albania under its control a year later. According to 
Bessenyei's report of 19 March 1939, the advance of German troops into Prague 
22 Ibid. 1939-16-929. 
23 Ormos, op. cit., 50-52, 55-61, 71-85. B. Krizman, Pavelic i ustase. [Pavelic and the 
Ustashas] Zagreb 1978,83-107. 
24 J. Csuka, A délvidéki magyarság története 1918-1941. [History of the Hungarians of the 
Southern Region 1918-1941]. Budapest 1995,484-485. 
25 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1939-16-856. 
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"elicited immense astonishment and great anxiety in the whole country. [...] 
A colleague who saw Cvetkovic on the day of the march into Prague said that the 
prime minister showed signs of a total collapse." But in his opinion, the Yugoslav 
government had not decided even in this desperate situation whether to pursue 
the "policy of compliance or that of the iron hand" in connection with the Hun-
garian minority.26 
There are several examples of both, such as the problems of granting pass-
ports which has already been mentioned, or the endless obstacles put in the way 
of cultural and educational associations. Nevertheless, there were a growing 
number of examples of compliance as well. For example, the decree issued by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Korosec, on 4 July 1938, which ordered that officials 
working in minority regions had to learn (or rather should have learned) the lan-
guage of the local ethnic minorities within three years.27 Although the decree was 
never enforced, it clearly demonstrated a positive change in governmental po-
licies. 
The temporary settlement of the Serbian-Croatian conflicts by the so-called 
Cvetkovic-Macek agreement created a favorable atmosphere for the Hungarians 
as well. The shift of the united centralist system towards "dualism" significantly 
eased the centralized political pressure of the preceding two decades or more, 
which granted minority rights as gifts on the basis of current political interests. It 
should also not be forgotten that when territorial expansion changed the weight 
of Hungary, the mother-country, in Central Europe, Yugoslavia saw its territorial 
integrity endangered in the changed political situation in Europe, especially after 
the outbreak of the war. 
Official Yugoslavia, which, in the words of Ambassador Bessenyei, "behaved 
in a relaxed and appropriate way" at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, in 
contrast to its own people, expected Hungary to make an official statement, 
which actually would not have meant Hungary's recognition of the Hungarian-
Yugoslav border, but which could still have been interpreted like that by the 
Yugoslav government to the general public. 
Until the conclusion of the Hungarian-Yugoslav so-called "pact of eternal 
friendship," however, Hungary was not willing to make any statements whatso-
ever concerning state borders. Pál Teleki and Dragiáa Cvetkovic, who formed 
a new government after Stojadinovic's fall (6 February 1939) had essentially the 
same aims in foreign affairs, namely to keep their countries out of war. Neither 
country managed to achieve this goal, and, although with some time lag and be-
cause of different reasons, both governments soon joined Germany and gave up 
their independence. 
Analyzing the effect of the second Viennese decision on Belgrade, the Hun-
garian ambassador remarked with bitterness: "[...] if in consequence of the Vien-
26 HNA, K-63, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1939-16/7-1486. 
27 HNA, K-609, Press Archive. Yugoslavia. Minority Affairs 1930-1937. Nemzeti Újság 
[National Newspaper], 5 July 1938. 
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nese decision we lost any political weight and prestige, then [we surely did so] 
both in Yugoslavian governmental circles and in the eyes of the general public."28 
Although the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement initiated by Stojadinovic 
came to a standstill in the fall of 1938, the situation was ripe for the question of 
the Hungarian minority to become an object of constant bargaining between the 
two governments. The internal political situation after the Serbian-Croatian 
compromise, the establishment of the Cvetkovic-Macek government (26 August 
1939), and the dissolution of the newly elected parliament together with the 
promise of new elections offered an excellent opportunity. Although new elec-
tions were never called, finding a new position for the ethnic Hungarians in the 
changed political situation became the object of serious bargaining on the one 
hand between the two governments, and on the other, between Belgrade and the 
leaders of the Hungarian minority. 
In such a situation the Hungarian government had to decide whether they 
wished to keep supporting both parties of Hungarians and "continue to exercise 
our influence exclusively in a way to encourage the two factions to work side by 
side if possible, instead of working against each other, or should we rather take 
a firm stand with one or the other group?"29 asked the Hungarian ambassador to 
Belgrade of his government. 
The difficulty of the decision lay in the fact that exclusive support for Iván 
Nagy's group would have meant for Belgrade that Hungary had officially 
pledged itself to the Croatian wing of the coalition. The Hungarian government 
could not take that upon itself in the circumstances, and it did not even want to 
do that on a temporary basis. Now they were content with formally demonstrat-
ing the political unity of ethnic Hungarians to the outsiders, which was achieved 
by the conciliation committee of six. The fragility of this unity, however, was very 
well known in Budapest. Bessenyei had rightly remarked in his report that al-
though this committee could temporarily maintain unity "with much effort," as 
soon as it came to elections, the unity would necessarily disintegrate. 
Immediately after the establishment of the new government, the ambassador 
began to bargain for future representative and senatorial positions, and the 
starting point was to get three seats for representatives and three for senators, 
following Budapest's directions. According to Bessenyei, Várady's senatorial seat 
seemed to be guaranteed, but as far as parliamentary seats were concerned, they 
would have to reckon with Belgrade's opposition, because three seats would be 
seen as too many. Since the regent and the government still insisted on the idea of 
"Yugoslavism", the only chance for the Hungarians to gain or bargain for seats 
was to join the ballots either of the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ) or Macek's op-
position. Presenting the Hungarians as an independent political power was ab-
solutely impossible. This was clearly recognized in Budapest, but the government 
28 HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Szentivânyi manuscript, 1943, 70. 
29 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1939-16-902. 
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there tried to set a high price for its support of the JRZ ticket. According to their 
calculations, Iván Nagy should not be hindered from entering the elections on the 
ballot of the opposition in Stari Becej (Óbecse), where he had strong support 
among poor Hungarian peasants. Therefore they were reluctant to support 
a Hungarian candidate against him on the radical ticket in that electoral district. 
However, expected Iván Nagy to unconditionally renounce his claim to take over 
the political leadership from the old politicians of the Hungarian Party. The 
Hungarian government emphatically told Iván Nagy that they would not sup-
port his claim. The instructions sent to Bessenyei by the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs on 26 October 1939 contained the following main points.30 Hungarians 
should not become politically passive in case the treaty fails. In addition to 
Varady's seemingly assured senatorial position, they should be given at least one 
more seat in the parliament, and the Yugoslav government should not interfere 
with the appointment of that representative. If Gábor Szántó's candidacy were 
forced again, it could only be accepted if an additional two seats would be guar-
anteed for Hungarian representatives. In. connection with Iván Nagy the Hun-
garian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the position that no other Hungarian can-
didate should be put up against him, not even if the Yugoslav government were 
raedy to permit it. In exchange, it should be arranged that Iván Nagy and his 
followers would put up no candidate in the electoral district designated for the 
candidate of the old Hungarian Party. Finally, the ethnic Hungarians of the 
southern regions were reminded to refrain absolutely from proclaiming the slo-
gan of autonomy during the elections. 
Budapest's position was transmitted to the Yugoslav government through 
Imre Várady, who presented it to the Minister of Transportation, Beslic, who was 
responsible for Hungarian affairs. During the meeting Beslic repeated the posi-
tion of his government: "not even" the Germans were allowed to set up a sepa-
rate minority party ballot, not to mention the Hungarians. As always, Beslic 
avoided naming any concrete privileges to be offered in exchange for the Hun-
garians' support of the government slate. All he said was that they would be 
"given a place" on the central committee of the government party as well as on 
the notaries board. Concerning the number of parliamentary positions, Beslic 
pointed out in an almost lamenting tone that if in Voivodina the Germans wanted 
to have five seats, the Hungarians three, and the Romanians two, the Serbs would 
be left with none. Both the Hungarians and the Germans should count on one 
senatorial seat and one parliamentary representative position each, and the Ro-
manians would only be given one or the other. Thus they were ready to support 
the minimal demands of the Hungarians, but beyond that, the minister empha-
sized, a maximum of one deputy representative position would be considered. 
He claimed he had no objection to either Leo Deák's or Gellért Fodor's candidacy, 
and if it were only a question of his decision, he would not push Szántó's candi-
dacy either. Várady was surprised at his statement concerning Deák, because it 
was well known that Deák, who was considered forceful - or, "what's more a bit 
30 Ibid. 1939-16-1019. 
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aggressive" - even by Bessenyei, was "absolutely repulsive" in the eyes of Bel-
grade. 
Reflecting on the most urgent problem mentioned by Varady, Beslic emphati-
cally declared that he could do nothing in the "present state of war" about the 
property restrictions in force in the border zone, which afflicted the Hungarian 
population most. On the other hand, he showed readiness to put those Hungar-
ian teachers who had been removed to Serbo-Croatian schools back into Hun-
garian schools. Nor was he completely averse to the most important Hungarian 
demand, the establishment of a united Hungarian cultural association. He asked 
Várady to work out the bylaws of such an association, and he promised to have 
them accepted. The new aspect of these negotiations was not so much the stand-
point of the Yugoslav government, which contained no new elements, but rather 
the fact that Beslic presented it "in the most fluent Hungarian language".31 In the 
event, the new elections were swept away by the tide of history, but nevertheless 
at the very least the negotiations resulted in Varady's re-appointment as a senator 
in March 1940.32 
Thus the situation of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia had not substan-
tially changed by the end of 1939: Belgrade still considered the affairs of the 
Hungarian minority a bargaining chip, which could be made use of in exchange 
for political services. Nevertheless, Budapest could communicate its views to 
Yugoslav governmental circles more directly and could openly keep contact with 
the Hungarian leaders. For their part, when Belgrade refused to allow the rees-
tablishment of a Hungarian political party and made promises that were never 
kept, they did so in a more cordial way, and even in Hungarian. However, the in-
creasingly self-confident Hungary did not yet wish to put great pressure on the 
Yugoslav government concerning the case of the Hungarian minority. 
The first Vienna award made it clear to Hungary that further territorial expan-
sion could only be achieved with the support of Germany. Understanding of this 
point was demonstrated by a series of political steps. For example, Béla Imrédy's 
government authorized the founding of a Nazi-like organization among the 
German minority, the Volksbund, and later the Teleki government resigned from 
the League of Nations and joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. With German con-
sent, and as a result of the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakian state, the 
Hungarian army marched into Sub-Carpathia (or Ruthenia, now in the Ukraine). 
On 30 August 1940, after the outbreak of war, the decision of the German and 
Italian judges was proclaimed in Vienna: Székelyföld and the northern part of 
Transylvania were given back to Hungary. While Hungarian society experienced 
these further changes with indescribable euphoria, the international reception of 
the second Vienna award was significantly different from that of the previous 
one. Both Great Britain and the United States regarded the decision as having 
been forced upon Romania. By the fall of 1940, Hungary gave up its neutrality 
31 Ibid. 1939-16-900. 
32 HNA, K-28, Documents of the Department of Minorities of the Prime Minister's Office, 
1940-R-16838. 
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and non-alignment, which was the basis of Pál Teleki's foreign policy, and on 20 
November 1940 joined the German-Italian-Japanese three-power pact. The free-
dom of action for Hungarian foreign policy was reduced to a minimum. Along 
the Hungarian border there was only one country which had yet not pledged it-
self to Germany, and that was Yugoslavia. This way Yugoslavia managed to keep 
out of the war in Europe for a while and to preserve its neutral position in spite of 
the fact that German victories on the western front pushed Belgrade into an in-
creasingly difficult situation. Apart from the politicians, only the British, German, 
and Soviet intelligence services were fighting their invisible wars in Yugoslavia at 
that time, and it still remained undecided which side the country would eventu-
ally join.33 
In the meantime Yugoslavia's external political situation was gradually wors-
ening. Hungary's joining the three-power pact, the dissolution of the Balkans al-
liance by Romania (3 October 1940), the presence of German forces in Romania, 
the Italian-Greek war and the military presence of the Italians in Albania, the 
summer victories of the German forces on the western front, the capitulation of 
France, a former ally, and the air raids on Britain nearly plunged the country into 
a hopeless situation, but at the same time these events also increased the impor-
tance of Yugoslavia in the eyes of the Germans, the Italians, and the British. In 
addition to all this, in the fall of 1940 a new actor appeared on the battlefield to 
establish its power in the Balkans: the Soviet Union. At the meeting of Hitler and 
Molotov on 12-13 November, the Soviet Union quoted an increase of its influence 
in the Balkans as one of the its conditions for joining the three-power pact. As is 
well known, however, Hitler would not tolerate any further territorial claims by 
his ally, and independently of the outcome of the negotiations, he gave orders al-
ready on the first day, November 12, to continue preparations against the Soviet 
Union and to work out strategic principles.34 
From the fall of 1940 onwards Germany's main endeavor in the "in-between" 
territories between the Soviet Union and Germany, including the Balkans, was to 
create a clear field for a military campaign against the Soviet Union. The small 
countries in the Balkans had only two options left to choose from: either become 
an ally of Germany, or become victims of the occupation. Regent Paul chose the 
first option. On 25 March 1941, Yugoslavia joined the three-power pact, which 
33 The Germans had built up their most important positions among the ethnic Germans 
in Banat, while the center of the British secret service was in the mine of Trepca. That is 
where Stanley William Baily, later head of the British SOE (Special Operations Execu-
tive) in Yugoslavia and future military consultant to the chetnik (Serbian right-wing) 
opposition worked as an engineer. One of the most successful centers of German intel-
ligence in Novi Sad (Újvidék) was the radio station called Nora, operated by Janko Sep, 
a German ethnic group leader. Tito, the leader of the Yugoslavian communists, organ-
ized a radio station in Zagreb for the Soviet intelligence service with the help of Mos-
cow and Istanbul. Enikő A. Sajti, "Josip Broz Tito." In P. Polonyi, Mao - E. A. Sajti, Tito. 
Budapest 2000,227-228. 
34 For the latest material on this topic in Hungarian see M. Ormos and I. Majoros, Európa 
a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. [Europe in the international arena] Budapest 1998,423-423. 
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did not seem to be a bad compromise at that time. Under the arrangement Yugo-
slavia would have no military obligations, and what is more, they were promised 
the long-sought harbor of Thessaloniki by the Germans. German diplomacy also 
promised them protection against Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Italian territorial 
demands. 
Until its joining of the three-power pact Yugoslavia remained, in Hungary's 
eyes, the gap in the German-Italian ring surrounding the country. Count István 
Csáky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, formulated this view as follows at his nearly 
hour-long meeting with the director of the Avala Yugoslavian news agency on 11 
November 1940: "Our only contact with foreign countries is the Budapest-Bel-
grade-Sofia-Istanbul line. If this line is broken, we also fall into the pit."35 From 
October 1940 Hungarian diplomacy started to inquire into Yugoslavia's inten-
tions concerning a closer pact with Hungary. It was clear both to Belgrade and to 
Hungary that Berlin would have no objection to a rapprochement of the two 
countries. 
On the contrary, because Hitler's own interest required that Yugoslavia 
should feel safe with Hungary as a neighbor, he played a role in Hungary's 
abandonment of its territorial demands in Yugoslavia in a Hungarian-Yugoslav-
ian treaty signed less than two months later, on 12 December 1940. During the ne-
gotiations preceding the signing of the treaty, there was the possibility of re-an-
nexing certain territories inhabited mostly by Hungarians, namely the counties of 
Senta (Zenta) and Backa Topola (Topolya). According to a report of July 2, 1940 
by the Hungarian military attaché in Berlin, his Yugoslav counterpart indicated 
that "the chief of the Yugoslav general staff declared that he would have no ob-
jections from a military point of view to the re-annexation of the Baranya triangle 
as well as Subotica (Szabadka) and its surroundings, for the sake of a compro-
mise with Hungary."36 
The question of possible territorial compensation was also addressed in Bes-
senyei's meetings with certain members of the Yugoslav government. However, 
Bessenyei clearly saw that if Yugoslavia gave any territorial concessions to Hun-
gary, they would have to do the same to their Bulgarian "brothers", and soon the 
Albanians and the Italians would present their demands too, that is to say "with 
this concession they themselves would initiate the process of the disintegration of 
the country." In spite of this fact, Bessenyei made an attempt to find out the 
standpoint of his Yugoslav counterpart following the instructions of his own 
government. In early October 1940 he first visited Miloje Smiljanic, Deputy Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, with whom, as he wrote, "I have such an intimate and 
confidential personal relationship that it makes it possible to discuss any topic." 
Smiljanic told him that after Czechoslovakia's disintegration and Romania's dis-
memberment Yugoslav official circles also began to deal with the thought that 
35 Aprilski rat 1941. Zbornik dokumenata. [The April War of 1941. A miscellany of docu-
ments] Belgrade 1971. Br. 303, 902. 
36 HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1940-16/7-3700. 
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"sooner or later Yugoslavia would also fall victim to the [territorial] re-arrange-
ments, [...] and that unsettled problems could be solved with less detriment if 
their settlement were initiated by Belgrade itself." He was also asked from many 
sides what were the minimum territorial demands "on the basis of which final 
concord could be achieved in Hungarian-Yugoslav relations." He answered these 
non-official inquiries, considered more like "private actions of political climbers 
and busybodies," each time in compliance with the official standpoint of his gov-
ernment. According to this, "the Hungarian government, although it would cer-
tainly welcome a spontaneous gesture from Yugoslavia which would cede terri-
tories with a primarily Hungarian population to the mother country, is so busy 
with the Transylvanian question for the time being that it does not wish to initiate 
any action to settle the Hungarian-Yugoslav conflict." It was not the question of 
territorial re-annexation that Smiljanic addressed in accordance with the stand-
point of his government, but the possibility of solving the minority problem 
through a population exchange. This was, however, refused by the Hungarian 
ambassador with the following words: "I was thinking a lot about what you told 
me about the population exchange, but unfortunately I came to the conclusion 
that this solution was absolutely impracticable. Permanent good relations be-
tween Hungary and Yugoslavia could only be achieved in two ways: either by 
the re-annexation of the territories inhabited by Hungarians, or by improving 
their conditions to such an extent that ethnic Hungarians would feel the same 
here as they would in the mother country and could move around just as freely." 
But, he added immediately, since the "spiritualization" of the borders is now 
a fully Utopian thought, only the first option could be taken into consideration. 
Since Smiljanic had obviously raised the issue of population exchange on a sud-
den impulse, Bessenyei interpreted his colleague's understanding of the exchange 
as follows: "The majority of the Hungarians would be given back to us together 
with the territories in which they are settled," and the classic form of population 
exchange seemed .to be a feasible arrangement only for scattered Hungarians. He 
indicated that Budapest would agree with this solution. 
Smiljanic wished to compensate for the considerable difference in the number 
of ethnic Hungarians and South Slavs living in the territory of the two countries 
by also involving the Ruthenians of Sub-Carpathia in the population exchange, 
because, he explained to Bessenyei, it would be better for Hungary if there were 
Hungarians living alongside those borders and not Ruthenians, because of the 
threat of the Russians. The Hungarian ambassador suspected that it was Vladimir 
Radic, the orthodox bishop of Munkács and an early friend of the deputy minis-
ter, who was behind Smiljanic's idea of removing the Ruthenians. At the end of 
his report Bessenyei noted that Smiljanic had suggested the population exchange 
only to save face, and "he had already realized the necessity of territorial conces-
sions."37 
37 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1940-16-722. 
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A few days later, on October 11, he visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Cincar-Markovic, to discuss the matter. The Minister confirmed Bessenyei's for-
mer suspicion that the Yugoslav government would most like to solve the prob-
lem with a radical population exchange, also including the Ruthenians, because, 
as Bessenyei interpreted his words, this way "they would get rid of all the Hun-
garians." But because his Hungarian counterpart was not willing to agree, they 
"acquiesced" in the idea of territorial concessions. They knew the territorial de-
mands of the Hungarian government, i.e. the Baíka (Bácska) to the Ferenc Chan-
nel, the Baranya Triangle, and the Mura region, but they were only willing to ne-
gotiate about the counties of Senta (Zenta) and Backa Topola (Topolya). How-
ever, they did not dare take the initiative in a solution to the conflict, because 
they were afraid that "if they gave in to the Hungarians, they would start an 
avalanche that could endanger the very existence of the country." Therefore, Bes-
senyei noted, "no concrete results should be expected [in this question] in the 
near future." Nevertheless, he would still continue the negotiations about these 
matters with the double purpose of making his Yugoslav counterparts as "famil-
iar" with the idea of territorial compensation as possible. On the other hand they 
would also be prepared for the highly unlikely event that if "as a result of some 
unexpected external or internal affair [the Yugoslavs] could still decide on action, 
the soil should be prepared at least in theory, also with respect to the details, if 
possible." Coming to the point at issue in the negotiations with Cincar-Markovic, 
Bessenyei pointed out that the foreign minister set out from the fact that, consid-
ering the great number of ethnic Hungarians, "either just or unjust" complaints 
could easily lead to a worsening of the relations between the two countries. He 
admitted that the Hungarian suggestion, a combination of the population ex-
change and the re-annexation of territories, could result in a "final settlement" of 
the conflict between the two countries. As a response, Bessenyei repeated Buda-
pest's position: population exchange as the exclusive solution was unacceptable, 
ethnic Hungarian communities should be handed over together with their terri-
tories, and population exchange would only be acceptable in the case of scattered 
ethnic Hungarians. Cincar-Markovic concluded the talks by saying that they con-
sidered a solution to this problem "neither timely nor urgent." Bessenyei re-
marked at the end of his report - with exaggerated optimism as later events 
showed - that the initiative should be left to the government in Belgrade in the 
hope that "they would not let a good opportunity slip."38 As far as the treaty was 
concerned, this "good opportunity" came in December 1940, but the friendship 
treaty did not touch upon either the minority or the territorial questions. Yugo-
slavia was obviously afraid of starting the avalanche endangering the integrity of 
the state, while Budapest did not want to risk its only open access to the West for 
38 Ibid. 1940-16-754. At the conference of the government party in Novi Sad (Újvidék) in 
October 8, Cvetkovic emphasized that although the minority problem had to be settled 
"in any case," it should "by no means be considered business or an issue of trading 
people." HNA, K-28, Documents of the Department of Minorities of the Prime Minis-
ter's Office, 1940-L-20867. 
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the time being. According to the second paragraph of the Yugoslavian-Hungar-
ian treaty of "eternal friendship", it was decided that the two countries "would 
negotiate on all those questions which were considered to have a possible influ-
ence on their mutual relations." That meant acceptance of the former Yugoslav 
position that minority conflicts should also be settled by "friendly conversations" 
in a friendly environment. It would not be wrong to say that Hungarian minority 
rights remained a matter for bargaining after the treaty, but that the bargaining 
grew beyond the bounds of internal politics. The two "business partners" were 
no longer the leaders of the Hungarian minority, with their feeble bargaining po-
sition, and the current government, but the Hungarian state, part of the Middle 
Powers, as a new partner in the bargain, which lent more weight to the claims of 
the southern Hungarians. The bounds of these claims were now determined by 
Hungary's foreign political interests to a much greater degree than before. 
In Zagreb they were reckoning with Hungary and the Hungarian minority in 
a totally different constellation. Senator Juraj Krnjevic, secretary general of the 
Croatian Peasants' Party, who had just returned from his exile in Switzerland and 
offered thanks for Hungary's support of him, visited László Bartók, the Hungar-
ian consul in Zagreb, at the end of February 1940, and openly declared to him 
that he himself found peaceful coexistence with the Serbs hopeless and would, 
after the war, much rather see the country in a Croatian-Hungarian federation in 
which Voivodina would enjoy autonomous status. But until then, if the Hungari-
ans in Voivodina would collaborate with the Croatians in the elections, they 
would guarantee at least ten to fifteen parliamentary seats for them and support 
of all of their "rightful" minority claims.39 
When, right after the Serbian-Croatian compromise, Bartók visited Macek, 
who "spontaneously" brought up the question of the ethnic Hungarians, he made 
a promise "to do everything he can to improve the situation of the Hungarian 
minority. Otherwise he wants to attain an autonomous status for Voivodina, and 
his policy concerning Croatia will assert the cultural and economic rights of the 
Hungarian minority in any case, because they [i.e. the Hungarians] have always 
stood by the Croatians both in good and bad times. His ultimate plan is to get the 
Hungarians in Voivodina back to us by means of an amicable agreement (?)." 
Macek formulated this very carefully as far as the future was concerned, and only 
said to Bartók that "he is a supporter of the idea of establishing an intensive trade 
contact" with Hungary.40 The ambassador to Belgrade, who, visiting him on the 
occasion of the compromise, asked him to support the cause of the Hungarian 
minority, was told essentially the same, but as Bessenyei noted, Macek was not as 
frank and friendly with him as he was with Bartók, because he considered him 
pro-Serb.41 
39 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1940-16-203; 240. 
40 HNA, K-74-I. Incoming cipher telegrams. Belgrade, 1939, no. 2. 
41 HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1939-16/7-4706. The latest research on the autonomy of Voivodina is summarized in 
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In the course of preparing the Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement, the question 
of state borders was brought up only formally, and it was not forced by the Hun-
garian side either. 
After the ratification of the agreement, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Pál 
Teleki, and the Foreign Minister, László Bárdossy, received Cincar-Markovic, 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in the palace of the Prime Minister on 27 February 
1941. During the conversation Teleki emphasized that in the cases of Czechoslo-
vakia and Romania the Hungarian public would not have tolerated the estab-
lishment of friendly relations with them before they had satisfied Hungary's ter-
ritorial demands. "On he other hand," he continued, "almost everybody under-
stood and accepted that we follow a different path with Yugoslavia, and that in 
this case we are striving for the re-establishment of mutual trust and amicable 
relations in order to be able to start solving the unsettled conflicts between us in a 
newly created positive atmosphere." Among unsettled conflicts he specified the 
issue of making the Danube navigable between Mohács and Bezdan and matters 
concerning the Hungarian minority. Passing on to the latter question, he stated 
with joy that "the atmosphere was generally getting better" and more and more 
"satisfactory" decrees were being issued, although they were not being enforced 
by lower-ranking authorities. He handed over to the Yugoslav foreign minister a 
note containing the most, urgent wishes of the Hungarians, which listed the 
problems of Hungarian education in the first place. Teleki gave further emphasis 
to this note orally when he pointed out that it would be all the easier to fulfill 
these wishes since similar demands of the German minority had already been 
granted in full by Belgrade. The note handed over contained the names of all 
sixty-four villages where Hungarian sections of primary schools were to be es-
tablished. Furthermore, fifty-four villages were also listed where, according to the 
Hungarian government, Hungarian school sections existed only formally, or 
were they had to be expanded in order to be able to receive every Hungarian pu-
pil. The note also contained a detailed list of names of those Hungarian teachers 
who were teaching in South Serbia, and of those Slav teachers who spoke no 
Hungarian, yet who were appointed to Hungarian school sections. Cincar-Mark-
ovic tried to defend himself by saying that in his opinion the schooling situation 
of the 150,000 South Slavs in Hungary was not particularly good either. After 
a short debate, however, Cincar-Markovic promised to pass on the demands of the 
Hungarians, and he suggested that, similarly to the Danube question, the educa-
tional needs of the minorities in the two countries should also be discussed at 
a meeting of experts. Then the list of grievances was continued by Teleki with the 
real estate restrictions in the border zone, and he also mentioned that the number 
of Hungarian village notaries and, eventually, chief magistrates should be in-
creased. He referred to a decree which was disadvantageous for Hungarian agri-
cultural co-operatives because it allowed the establishment of an independent 
supervisory center only over three hundred co-operatives. 
R. Koncár, Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929-1941. [The opposition parties 
and the autonomy of Voivodina, 1929-1941] Belgrade 1995. 
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At the end of the negotiations the Yugoslav foreign minister mentioned the 
necessity of settling the conflict between the Greek Orthodox churches in Hun-
gary and in Yugoslavia, which had already been addressed during the visit of 
Bálint Hóman, Minister of Religion and Education, in Belgrade. At this meeting 
they agreed that negotiations would be carried out to settle the conflicts without 
the direct participation of the two governments, yet with their "kind/positive 
support." They also agreed to establish scientific and literary institutions mutu-
ally in their respective countries.42 The note did not address the question of re-or-
ganizing the independent Hungarian Party, a matter which had been stressed so 
persistently earlier, and the case of a united Hungarian cultural association was 
not brought up because its authorization had already been agreed to. 
The work of old societies had also been resumed in this new atmosphere 
which showed more tolerance than ever before, in spite of all the limitations. The 
renowned Folk Circle (Hungarian Reading Circle) of Subotica (Szabadka) was re-
opened, together with the nearly sixty-year-old Hungarian Cultural Community 
of Banat. On 3 February 1940, the Hungarian Cultural Community of Zagreb was 
founded, the forerunner of which was the Catholic Hungarian students' associa-
tion known as Voivodina. On 30 January 1941, a long hoped-for dream of the 
ethnic Hungarians came true: the united cultural organization of the Yugoslav 
Hungarians, the Yugoslav Hungarian Cultural Association, was authorized. Ac-
cording to Yugoslav accounts, the Hungarians had had eighty-three associations 
at the end of the 1920s, including Catholic and Reformed church organizations, 
farmers' and reading circles, charitable institutions, sports clubs, firemen's asso-
ciations, women's societies, and so on.43 It should be mentioned here that the 
Hungarian theatre, banned immediately after the arrival in of the Serbian troops, 
was replaced primarily by amateur groups working in the institutional frames of 
the Folk Circle of Subotica (Szabadka) and the Cultural Community of Banat, and 
later by the Maecenas Circle of Subotica. These amateur groups were supported 
by theatre directors from Hungary and Transylvania. Two of them deserve to be 
mentioned here by name, József Nádasdy, director of the National Theatre of 
Pécs, former director of the theatre in Subotica, and Miklós Ungvári from Tran-
sylvania. While in the early 1920s there were three Hungarian theatre companies 
in Czechoslovakia and eleven in Transylvania,44 the authorization/legalization of 
42 HNA, K-64, Confidential Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1941-16-85; HNA, K-28, Documents of the Department of Minorities of 
the Prime Minister's Office, 1940-F-20119. 
43 Mesaros, op. cit. 365-367. On the work of the Yugoslavian Hungarian Cultural Associa-
tion see Gy. Kramer, "A Délvidéki Magyar Közművelődési Szövetség feladatai és 
munkája," [Goals and Work of the Hungarian Cultural Association of the Southern 
Region] In Z. Csuka, ed., A visszatért Délvidék. (The Southern Region Regained) Buda-
pest 1941, 43-54; A. Kasas, Madjari u Vojvodini 1941-1946. [Hungarians in Voivodina, 
1941-1946] Novi Sad 1996,22-23,100-105. 
44 Hírlap, 8 June 1922. Sándor Földessy, who tried to impart a new impulse into Hungar-
ian theatrical life in the mid-1920s, did not leave very pleasant memories behind, since 
he had to leave for Hungary quickly because of his debts. Tubán noted the following 
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an independent Hungarian theatre was rejected for two decades in Yugoslavia, 
because the authorities saw the danger of irredentism in it. 
In an official communication of September 23, 1938, the Department of State 
Security of the Ministry of the Interior suggested that the Danubian ban, Svetislav 
Rajic, authorize a professional Hungarian theatre, with a line of argument gener-
ally characteristic of the authorities. According to the Department of State Secu-
rity, the government should authorize the theatre "in its own, easily conceivable 
interest," because there were two hundred Hungarian amateur companies in 
Voivodina, and "in these groups a Hungarian democracy is developing, which 
does not exist in Hungary." "Semi-literate" young people who know only a cou-
ple hundred words of Hungarian "learn the Hungarian literary language in these 
companies," since, the argumentation continues, these companies are "the beams 
of light of Hungarian culture, existence, and activities, and who knows what 
happens there after the lay performances." Therefore, "the establishment of 
a professional theatre should be authorized, but the amateur companies should be 
banned. [...] This way we can get rid of about two hundred busy Hungarian na-
tionalistic and cultural activists, put out these two hundred beams of light which 
are all illuminating the Hungarian sky, and we would replace the active youth by 
an audience that only listens, i.e. by a passive mass of people." Then the argu-
mentation of the Head of the Department of State Security continues in a tone 
characteristic for the period: "Once that theatre is established, the government 
can ban the amateur companies in order to protect the Hungarian theatre itself, 
i.e. to ensure the moral and financial success of the Hungarian theatre in every 
Hungarian village." Although, he added in an condescending manner, that pro-
fessional Hungarian theatre would also be amateurish, because there were alto-
gether only three Hungarian professional actors in Voivodina. The ban noted in 
his answer that he had been urging the authorization of a professional Hungarian 
theatre for these reasons for ten years already, but the Ministry of the Interior had 
instead been supporting amateur groups so far. Finally the ban added as an im-
portant argument that he had noticed that as soon as the Hungarians had to raise 
financial support for the theatre, "their enthusiasm started to decline immedi-
ately."45 After a number of unsuccessful attempts, financially supported by the 
Hungarian government, the first professional Hungarian theatre company was 
finally founded in Belgrade in January 1940, with a concession granted to a Rus-
sian immigrant called Mihajlo Mangier, and it was housed in the Russian Home. 
The director was Mihály Vincze, who had emigrated to Yugoslavia from Hun-
gary. Among its members there were also amateurs from Voivodina, but the ma-
about him in one of his reports: Földessy and some of his fellow actors "were drinking 
and partying together with Serbian officers day after day, and they left considerable 
debts behind upon leaving." According to Tubán, the company "was not first class", 
but it was still better than the Serbian ones. HNA, K-437, Documents of Center of the 
Association of Social Societies, 1928-11/10-195,618. 
45 AV, F 126, Kabinet bana, pov. br. 221/1938. 
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jority of the actors came from Hungary.46 The work of the theatre was not untrou-
bled even during its short existence, and the performances were often prohibited. 
On one occasion, for example, this happened because members of the company 
were in contact with the Bolyai Farkas Society of Hungarian university students 
in Belgrade, where, according to the chief police officer of Belgrade, "there ap-
pear also persons who do secret intelligence work against the Yugoslav state." 
The Hungarian government did not seem to have made a particular point of 
having a Hungarian theatre company in Belgrade either, because, for example, on 
the prohibition of certain performances (e.g. John the Valiant) Bessenyei thought 
that the Belgrade company "deserve[d] no stronger intervention from our side 
because of either its program or its performances." On the other hand, he consid-
ered it important to warn the Bolyai Farkas Society to refrain from activities 
which could awaken suspicion in official circles, because, as he put it, "an organi-
zation of such intellectual and material importance from the point of view of the 
ethnic Hungarians here should not suffer any harm whatsoever."47 
The Hungarian Cultural Community of Zagreb set as its goal the moral and 
religious education of the Hungarians and the youth in Croatia, the preservation 
of the Hungarian language, folk customs, and national characteristics, as well as 
"the observance of civic duties and of obligations towards the Croatian nation." 
As president they appointed Sándor Molnár, a craftsman from Zagreb. 
The Yugoslav (or Southern) Hungarian Cultural Association comprised and 
co-ordinated all cultural, youth, university, college, agricultural, and other Hun-
garian societies and associations. Its authorization also meant, as mentioned 
above, that a united Hungarian organization, which had been missing since the 
proclamation of the dictatorship, was brought about not in the form of a political 
party, but as a cultural association, which reflected the compromise between Bel-
grade and Budapest. The Yugoslavian Hungarian Cultural Association regarded 
the meeting of 24 November 1940 in Novi Sad (Újvidék) as its statutory founding 
meeting, but, it was not officially authorized until 30 January 1941 (or February 2, 
according to other sources), i.e. after the signing of the treaty of eternal friend-
ship. As president they elected Gyula Kramer, a tradesman from Novi Sad 
(Újvidék), who had kept out of earlier battles of party politics. According to 
a summary published by him after the re-annexation, in the period of approxi-
mately six weeks from the foundation of the association to the marching in of the 
Hungarian troops the number of their members rose to 150,000, which means 
practically that every adult Hungarian of the southern region became a member 
of the Hungarian Cultural Association. There were organizing committees in one 
hundred and forty-nine towns and villages, and one hundred and fifty-one dif-
ferent societies, organizations, sports clubs, etc. declared their allegiance to the 
association. In accordance with the spirit of the age, the statutes set as their goal 
46 HNA, K-28, Documents of the Department of Minorities of the Prime Minister's Office, 
1940-F-15564. 
47 HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1940-16/7-1237. The Bölyai Farkas Society was founded in 1933. 
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to preserve the moral, spiritual, social, physical, and cultural characteristics of the 
Hungarians and to achieve their financial and social welfare on a Christian and 
national basis, while making the ethnic Hungarians fulfill their duties as citizens 
of the Yugoslav Kingdom as well. When Leo Deák had outlined the duties of 
a united Hungarian Cultural Society in an exclusive circle in the difficult years of 
the early 1930s after the establishment of the royal dictatorship, he had done so to 
the spirit of membership of a universal Hungarian culture.48 
The growing tolerance of the authorities from the fall of 1940 onwards was 
undoubtedly elicited by fear, and was thus confused, desperate, and insincere. 
There was no trace of a reappraisal of Belgrade's views held since 1918: minori-
ties, thus also the Hungarian minority, were still considered to weaken the state 
and to be forces of disintegration, and therefore the main goal should be to con-
trol them primarily by means of state power. While gradual worsening of the in-
ternational political situation for Yugoslavia, forced the government to act more 
positively towards minorities, the old traditions of the administration were still 
dominant in the territories inhabited by the Hungarians. 
In a report from late November 1940, for example, the counselor at the em-
bassy in Belgrade wrote about the detention of more than one hundred Hungari-
ans from Backa (Bácska), who were arrested for singing a song called "The March 
of Backa," which was considered to be irredentist.49 
European political events influenced not only the international situation and 
domestic politics of the two countries, of course, but also the disposition of the 
people. The euphoric effects of the territorial re-annexations are reflected in the 
number of suicides in Hungary which dropped from 29.3 to 23.6 per 100,000 in-
habitants within one year, between 1938 and 1939. Such a decrease had been un-
precedented.50 Although we do not have any comparable statistics from the 
southern regions, a report by Henrik Werth, Chief of the General Staff, to the for-
eign minister in mid-October 1940 relates that iri the south "there is a strong revi-
sionist tone/atmosphere. Textiles are being purchased for national flags in great 
quantities, not only in Hungarian stores, but also in Serbian ones. Both men and 
women are having Hungarian national costumes made. Everybody is acting as if 
it were only a question of days until the Hungarian Army marches in."51 And the 
marching in did, indeed, ensue, not within days, but in a few months. 
48 HNA, K-28, Documents of the Department of Minorities of the Prime Minister's Office, 
1933-R-11000. Kramer, op. cit., 43-45. 
49 HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1940-16/7-6656. 
50 I. Romsics, Magyarország története a XX. században. [The History of Hungary in the 
Twentieth Century! Budapest 1999, 246-247. 
51 HNA, K-63, Documents of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1940-16/7-5775. 
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